The Maronite Cause

In addition to the economic and security myths we addressed earlier, the absence of international support for a radical change of the Lebanese regime is generally considered another reason why federalism or partition are not viable.

Detractors will often point out that the international community does not currently support changing the system or dividing the republic into separate states. That is true; how can the international community support something that does not yet exist?

This objection is backwards: we need to show legitimate support for change on the ground and build our self-governance first; international support will follow. In modern international affairs, foreign support and recognition follow the local desire for self-determination, not the other way around.

The days of two superpowers drawing lines on a map are long gone. The great powers of today follow the lines drawn by political and ethnic realities on the ground.

In other words, we must establish the conditions of self-governance and push the regime towards confederalization before expecting the world to notice and support such a project.

Changing a regime and even carving a new sovereign state is not a poem nor something politically impossible; it is a legal and diplomatic sequence.

Two frameworks matter here: internal legality (how we constitute authority among ourselves) and international legibility (how we appear to others).

Once we meet the conditions for these two frameworks, the rest is about finding the right opening in international politics to convince the world that this solves a problem instead of creating one.

1. Internal Legality: The Extra-Constitutional Path

Internal legality begins with translating collective will into binding authority. There are two ways that a regime change or separation can happen in any country:

1) Through elections and parliamentary and constitutional frameworks.

2) Through establishing a political reality on the ground that can impose a new order from outside the constitution (basically exactly what Hezbollah did in Lebanon for the past 36 years).

Personally, I’m not very hopeful of the parliamentary path, and in our book The Maronite Cause we propose a real-politik path of establishing our own institutions without waiting for permission or approval from the Lebanese state.

Once self-governance institutions are established and the network of governance in the Christian region is well greased with proper services, legitimate representation, and transparent accountability mechanics, the plea of our people can be expressed and bound by a written document, usually labeled as a White Paper (pre-constitution).

The White Paper lays out the facts, maps, institutions, rights, finances, and the civil-protection doctrine of the civil administration.

The next step will be to get the white paper adopted, ratified and legitimized by district assemblies that represent municipalities, ecclesial and civic institutions, professional orders, and diaspora observers. This process builds internal legitimacy before reaching a public referendum in the Christian de facto canton. Of course, there are many steps in the beginning, like building proper political movements and establishing functional administrative institutions, and there are several steps in the middle, such as municipality-level referenda and treaties, but generally speaking, this is the big picture for achieving internal legitimacy.

Of course, if by some miracle, the Lebanese parliament had a majority that supports self-determination and regime change by then, the referendum might not even be necessary, and a new constitution and canton treaties can be established with ease. However, if we’re going the extra-constitutional road, then we need to do the right mechanisms of internal legitimacy, and that means institutional-building and referendums.

Once the referendum is positive, the White Paper is developed into a constitution, and the municipality-level treaties of the cities and towns under self-governance become part of the new basic provisional law.

2. International Recognition

The most likely scenario as our self-determination movement gains momentum is a de facto reality in which Lebanon stays as one internationally recognized state, but becomes carved up in practice into several ethno-regional administrations in which our Christian people rule their own affairs, as do others.

In this scenario, international recognition is not a pressing concern, as it does not immediately affect our ability to govern ourselves, although it does limit our foreign relations options.

However, as the regional administrations become stronger, we move closer to the classic Montevideo criteria of four attributes of statehood: Permanent population, defined territory, functional government, and the capacity to enter into international relations.

The first three criteria are facts of administration; the fourth is a program. Such a program can be achieved by establishing a small foreign service that negotiates non-aggression declarations, trade and transit, grid interconnects, mutual assistance, and cooperation between the Christian canton and foreign states.

International recognition of a separate administration in Mount Lebanon is not as impossible as some make it seem. In the end, we’ve seen the international community establish direct relationships with a classified terrorist organization without thinking twice, simply because that organization held the cards on the ground. If we build something concrete and tangible, the world will take notice. In the end, what matters here are the results: is this new reality creating a new problem or solving an old one? If we do our work correctly, the world will be able to see that a smaller, better governed Lebanon where each of its communities manage their own affairs, is more predictable and valuable for regional stability than a failed pluralist narco-terror state ruled by Mullahs.

If we have the key elements together, international politics will follow. And these elements are internal legitimacy, a proven ability of governance, and most importantly, being an element of regional stability.

Having solid international relations helps, and making an acceptable legal argument for self-determination also supports the cause forward.

The remedial secession argument can be used to fulfill the last condition: persistent failure of a state to secure basic rights and equality justifies a people’s quest for self-governance and cements the moral dimension of the project.

The legal argument for minority rights and self-determination according to Human Rights principles and the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities is another angle of international law also in favor of our self-rule.

3. Self-determination is an internal condition of governance

Getting international support is a great proven way to accelerate our self-determination process, but it is not a requirement for self-governance. Self-governance is an internal condition, not external.

A nation can rule itself for years or decades without getting full sovereignty and international recognition, like in the case of Kurdish administration in Northern Iraq, or the case of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa.

That is why the Christian canton must be legible in acceptable ways, with the rule of law, equality of citizens, human rights protection, good neighbor policies, and adherence to international laws. Once that happens, the rest of the process is a matter of time and political openings.

It might be a few years, even decades, before complete international recognition happens, but the path towards it is not some insurmountable task as depicted by the opponents of self-determination.

With internal legitimacy in place and a credible rule of law, informed by our long tradition of lawful governance, getting self-determination to be recognized on the international stage is a solvable puzzle, and not an impasse.